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Summary
The opening up of the national fi nancial systems of new EU-countries contain both conside-
rable economic advantages and signifi cant risks. Their national systems did not adapt to the 
accelerating innovation in the fi eld of fi nancial instruments. The  fi scal and monetary control 
systems are  the toolkit of regulations, its effects on process of revitalization are evident.
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1. Introduction
Demand rose from the early 1930s to measure the performance of the national 
economies. The result of this procedure was the establishment of the national 
accounts system, worked out by Simon Kuznetz, on which GDP is also based. 
Even Kuznetz warned that well-being is not equal to the income produced by 
a nation or to the increasing rate of income. Up to this day basically two view-
points have gained general acceptance. The fi rst one places income growth to its 
centre, while the other rather lays emphasis on qualitative change. The difference 
between the two schools is inherent in the applied indicators. 
Thus performance measurement at national level is not a new phenomenon. 
However, the question is whether it is enough to measure only the performance 
of the whole national economy? The answer is a defi nite Cno” at both schools 
because this kind of measurement does not give us enough and adequate infor-
mation about what (desired or undesired) structure the performance was accom-
plished.
To measure performance at all fi elds of life it is very important to be able to 
answer the following questions: (1) What?; (2) When and Why?; and (3) How? 
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– in this order. In microeconomic circumstances it is more or less solvable becau-
se the goal or goals are clear and it is easier to make a good timing on measures 
which are well supported with adequate analysis. These kinds of analyses at the 
same time identify the implements which are needed to reach the goals. 
While performance is generated continuous attention must be paid to the ap-
plied procedures and adequate feed-back must also be made so that the prede-
termined goals could be realised and that the situation in which the goals are 
changed according to the results could be avoided. This holds true at both micro, 
and higher level. The difference lies in the complexity of the systems. A compa-
ny at microeconomic level has clear aims and it has simpler methods to specify 
the answers to the above questions. At higher level of economy (local, and mac-
roeconomic) the goals are very complicated and may even be contradictory to 
each other, which makes the basic questions hardly answerable. These kinds of 
confl icts between the aims call our attention to the real problems of performance 
measurement.
This paper tries to throw light upon the limits of the fi scal and monetary con-
trol systems which, for this reason, require the shift of focus and gives insight 
into some problems related to fi nancial aspects of sustainable city revitalisation.
2. Material and methods
This paper is based on the analysis of special literature about both fi scal and 
monetary supervisions and revitalization. The main source was the „Ellenőrzési 
fi gyelő” which is a Hungarian quarterly specialized in the topic of supervisions. 
To the fi scal part of this paper the homepage of European Court of Auditors, to 
the monetary part the „De Larosiere” Report gave important and valuable infor-
mation. For revitalization part of the paper online scientifi c databases were used.
3. Results
3.1. The fiscal audit
In view of the direction of fi scal audit it can be divided into two parts. One of 
them is the fi nancial regularity audit while the other one is the performance au-
dit. The fi nancial regularity audit concerns the reliability, the lawfulness and the 
regularity of the accounts, while performance audits focus on the economy, ef-
fi ciency and effectiveness. These audits ensure the security of public fi nancing, 
which is the main goal of the fi scal audits [Kovacs, 2004].
The question is given: How can we measure the performance and the effi cien-
cy of this audit system at national level?
The answer is also given by the European Court of Auditors (ECA). Since 
1994 ECA has been obliged to make a report about the reliability of the EU fi nan-
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cial report which is called DAS (déclaration d’assurance). It is based on statistical 
sampling and the essence of this is that ECA examines the whole institutional 
and control system connected with the different revenues and expenditures. If 
the errors are not higher than 5% of the amount of money which was spent on the 
examined measures the DAS can be issued (reliability is higher than 95%).
This audit system reliability method is also suitable to examine not only the 
whole system but also its structures and this way the causes of the mistakes can 
be revealed. There is an expressive example at the fi eld of agriculture where the 
EU fi nancing between 2007 and 2013 comes from basically two funds: European 
Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and European Agricultural Fund for Rural 
Development (EAFRD). The ECA report about the year 2007 shows that the 
reliability of the money spent on agriculture and natural resources was at the 
level of reliability between 95% and 98%. It must be noted that the biggest part of 
the faults came from EAFRD but the largest amount of money goes through the 
institutional and control system of EAGF [European Court of Auditors, 2008]. 
The structural analysis of the faults and mistakes disclosed by the audits is useful 
for future audits, too because these audits identify the risky fi elds that should be 
better supervised in the future. Besides, if we get a clear picture of the problem, 
we can make suggestions to correct them. 
For this structural analysis – because of the variability of the circumstances at 
the different fi elds – it is necessary to base the audits on the same principles and 
standards. INTOSAI (International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions) 
has worked out these standards at the fi eld of fi scal audit. The basic documents 
are (1) the Lima Declaration; (2) the Code of Ethics; and (3) the Standards of the 
Audits.
The standards have a signifi cant role in the whole system of public admini-
stration, because the supreme audit institutes (SAIs) do not have enough resour-
ces to control all public spending. Here is the point where the local independent 
internal audit bodies which belong directly under the leader of the public body 
come into the control system because the mistakes, faults and the weak perfor-
mances in the operation of the state is attributed to the lack of adequate internal 
control. The external control with wide range of authority and capacity is still 
unable to solve the problems at the different institutions, government offi ces, and 
local authorities coming from the weak internal controls which fi nally manifest 
itself in daily mistakes [Kovács, 2005a]. Thus it is relevant to the required opera-
tion of the public sector (to legally collect and effectively spend the public funds) 
that the external and internal controls are in harmony with each other and that 
they construct a gapless system [Ákos, 2006]. 
We have not yet answered the question: How? The fi nancial regularity audit 
can be compared to a qualitative plan-fact analysis. The plans contain the rules, 
laws, regulations and procedures which should be realized and the facts contain 
the practice which was explored by the audits. If we know these plans and facts 
the audits can be made easily, the task is given.
The situation is not the same at the fi eld of performance audits. If we would 
like to compare it to a qualitative plan-fact analysis too we would run into diffi -
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culties. As it was mentioned at the introduction at macroeconomics level the go-
als are heterogeneous and complex and the aims can easily contradict each other 
(for example let us consider the Philips-curve).
At macroeconomics level it is necessary to point out all the indicators which 
should be changed. If we know them we have to specify with adequate analy-
sis and modelling how these indicators affect the economy and each other. 
Furthermore, as these indicators and their effects may change in time, it is a con-
tinuous task. These indicators represent the plan-variable. 
The next question is: Why the selected indicators are the plan-variable and 
when should we use them?
The answer can be found in the economic and social situation. The economic 
development as a general goal can be reached by means of two basic models. The 
starting-point of the fi rst one is that it tries to strengthen the basis of sustainable 
economic growth through the improvement of competitiveness. The other model 
places the saving and strengthening of the social cohesion in the centre.
The scenario which deliberately places the improvement of competitiveness 
into the centre of the social and economic disposing power is aimed at maximi-
sing individual social and fi nancial responsibility. Besides, it tries to reduce the 
servicing role of the state and the bureaucracy which are combined with the idea 
of general tax reduction. As a result both the redistribution function of the state 
and the resource wastage decrease and more money can stay in the competitive 
sector thus improving their position and the fl exibility of the whole economy. 
This scenario supposes an accelerating economic growth and the modernization 
of the society. This goes together with changes which increase social uncertainty, 
make strained relations and cause big chance-differences. These effects work 
against the necessary risk taking at the fi eld of economic policy [Kovács, 2005c].
At the other scenario based on social cohesion the role of the public bodies 
are still high, which ensures the basic social services. In this model the private 
sector accepts more and more roles in state services. It requires a considerable 
demand on public spending thus the risk of the revenue creation is very high too 
[Kovács, 2005c].
Naturally, none of the two scenarios can be used on their own. It is necessary 
to fi nd the adequate transition between the models. Referring back to the que-
stions: Why and When? the question cannot be formulated without the answer of 
the question: What?
As for the answer to the question: What? we can fi nd in the basic values of 
society and in the consensus based national program [Kovács, 2004]. If a national 
economy is able to decide which course of development is the most suitable and 
is also able to divide the plan into detailed measures, actions and programs – si-
milarly to the planning method used in micro level – then we get the indicators 
which we would like to change. 
If a nation has been able to verify what it would like to achieve then it will also 
be able to select the economic growth course and it can determine all the tasks 
and obligations that are referred to as task of the state. After this we can make 
priorities. The extenct of the role of the state thus can be cleared [Kovács, 2005b]. 
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Previously – intentionally in a reversed order – we tried to demonstrate the 
national planning and conception making procedure. The goal of it was to prove 
that the fi rst steps of any kind of planning is to decide where we would like to go 
or what we would like to achieve (what we would like to get and what we would 
not like) anything else may come after this phase. 
We can tell about the limits of the fi scal audit that the challenge appears not 
at the fi eld of fi nancial regularity audits but at the fi nancial performance audits. 
If a nation (and its economy) cannot select a growth course which is based on 
consensus, backed up by adequate papers [Kovács, 2005a] and determine the 
role of the state than it leads to payments without any conception or well selected 
priorities (resource wasting). If it is combined with a high risk budget (for exam-
ple: the over-planning of revenues, under-planning of payments1, or basis-based 
budget2 instead of program-based budget [Bathó, 2007] without any risk analysis 
[Csapodi, 2008] then the chance for realization will be very low – not to mention 
the measurability of the performances. 
The „value for money” principle is enforced only in the case of measurable 
performances which needs (1) the creation of a national program, (2) the clarifi ca-
tion of the basic values of the nation, (3) the accurate defi nition of the role of the 
state, (4) the management view at public sector, and (5) the quality-focussed pub-
lic services. If these criteria are met then the audits can achieve their basic techni-
cal goals namely (1) prevention, (2) correction and (3) sanctions [Kovács, 2004]. 
3.2. The monetary audit
For the measurement of the performances – as it was mentioned in the intro-
duction – the questions What, When and Why and How must be answered. At 
the fi eld of monetary audit these questions are relatively easy. The fi rst three 
questions can practically be answered with a complex sentence: The basic aim 
of the monetary audit is to provide prudential and undisturbed operation for the 
market of fi nancial services [Farkas, 2004] or in other way: continuous control of 
the fi nancial system.
The main question here is „How”? The fi rst question is: what kind of model – 
organization – is used for monetary audits?
The monetary audit has many forms. They are developed through history (this 
kind of bodies at western countries have much longer history) and because of it 
there are no uniform rules to make or operate a monetary supervisory body. The 
countries which started establishing these bodies in the early 90’s could choose 
from the existing (but different) models [Seregdi, 2008].
In the EU states we can meet with the following models:
1 In this case because of the too much priorities or the lack of priorities the „lawn mower princi-
ple” success can be expected which is stopping the realization of the whole.
2 In this case the aim of the public bodies from year to year more and more resource to get inde-
pendent of its tasks and obligations.
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–  The banking supervisory is inside the national banks and the other super-
visory bodies like insurance, capital market, etc. are inside the Ministry of 
Finance.
–  In the second model the banking supervisory is independent and the other 
supervisory bodies either operate independently or as a part of a ministry. 
If there are more independent supervisory bodies a supervisory committee 
is needed to harmonize their work and assure the fl ow of information.
–  Uniform or integrated3 supervisory body either inside the national bank or 
outside as an independent supervisory body.
–  The fourth model is the so called „twin-peaks” model. The supervisory 
bodies are divided into parts not by the fi nancial markets (sectors) but 
functions. The two peaks are: (1) prudential supervisory of the institu-
tions, and (2) the authority responsible for the appropriate operation of the 
fi nancial markets. In this model we can fi nd the sector brake downs inside 
the institutional supervisory [Seregdi, 2008].
We can see in the pervious parts that there is no one uniform supervisory 
model for each country. The listed models developed roughly after each other in 
time. The cause of it is the „revolution of the fi nancial products” in the 70’s which 
made it possible to connect and accumulate unlimited risks throughout the world 
by the big fi nancial institutes [Asztalos, 2005].
On the one hand there was an increasing demand for effi cient supervisory 
bodies which could control the universal fi nancial service providers within the 
states. On the other hand the fi nancial markets can be disturbed easily by other – 
not supervised – sectors or institutions thus there was a need to control the whole 
fi nancial market.
The importance of the national supervisory bodies increased parallel to the 
European integration – due to the regulations that concern the free movement 
of capital and service providing. This means that any fi nancial institution can 
provide fi nancial services into any member state inside the EU without any su-
pervision by the supervisory body of the host country. This requires cooperation 
between the EU states and a kind of uniform regulation background, too. Inside 
the integrated EU market there must be uniformed conditions most importan-
tly in two fi elds: (1) regulatory convergence and (2) supervisory convergence 
[Seregdi, 2008]. 
The reasons for the regulatory convergence:
1)  Security requirements (because of the specifi c characteristics of the fi nan-
cial institutions it is necessary to make more detailed regulations as the 
normal companies which mean a guarantee for the security of the fi nancial 
system).
2)  Equal competition conditions (because of the duality and asymmetry of 
security and profi tability).
3 We can talk about integrated supervisory body if all participant of the supervised fi nancial 
market are examined with (1) uniform methods, (2) uniform principles, (3) on prudential base and 
(4) from the viewpoint of correct market behaviour. 
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3)  Consolidated supervision4 (the whole fi nancial conglomerate is supervised 
only one body – the body which supervises the leader of the conglomerate).
The regulatory convergence was thought to be solvable by the „level three 
committees” CEBS, CESR and CEIOPS5 (Lamfalussy process). During the crea-
tion of the jointly accepted standards the aim was not only the regulatory but also 
the methodological convergence, too. To be more precise not only the rules but 
the procedures and methods are similar. (It is in the interest of the big fi nancial 
conglomerates, too because in this way they can reduce costs connected to the 
internal supervisory controls.)
The demand of unifi cation at supervisory bodies is not a new phenomenon 
– there were earlier attempts for harmonization, too (BASEL I., SOLVENCY 
I., and CRIME I. → SUPERVISION I.). Their great disadvantage was that they 
were able to estimate and document the things only after they had already happe-
ned, that is why the new generation of these standards (BASEL II., SOLVENCY 
II. and CRIME II.) were created. The common elements of this second generation 
of the supervisory regulator mechanisms are as follows:
1)  Every fi nancial institute has to identify their risks based on the same prin-
ciples.
2)  More public information are conductive to institutional transparency 
– controls between each other.
3)  The quality transformation of the connection between the fi nancial insti-
tutions and the supervisory bodies [Asztalos, 2005].
Supervision II. means the new paradigm of the supervisory body controls. It is 
created parallel with the previously mentioned second generation standards but it 
is produced as a result of a several year process. This supervision is (1) risk based, 
(2) continuous, (3) preventive, (4) normative, and (5) able to self-regulate itself. 
The desired levels of the parameters are achieved step by step [Asztalos, 2005].
The question arises: will there be a Common European Supervisory body? 
because both regulatory and supervisory convergence has the aims of better co-
operation and standardization [Seregdi, 2008]. The answer in the short run6 is 
a defi nite „no” but later it can be developed.
How could the European supervisory system be not only effective but also 
powerful? [Farkas, 2004]
Task delegation – primarily in order to facilitate the close cooperation be-
tween home-host supervisory bodies (national regulations about the share of re-
sponsibilities).
Colleges of Supervisors – these colleges are organized around big fi nancial 
conglomerates thus the experts can work together directly. They have no right 
to make decisions but through the colleges the national supervisory bodies can 
make the necessary steps.
4 The co-operation between Consolidating Supervisors and Host Supervisors (GL09 CEBS).
5 CESR – Committee of European Securities Regulators; CEBS – Committee of European Ban-
king Supervisors; CEIOPS – Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pension Supervisors.
6 De Larosiere Report V. 218.
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3)  Implementation of the newest generation of supervisory standards into the 
Acquis Communautaire.
4)  Cooperation with the supervisory bodies from the third countries.
The last point is particularly important because – as it was mentioned at the 
supervisory models – more supervisory models and more supervisory philo-
sophies were developed in the world so we can be sure that there will not be one 
uniform global fi nancial regulatory and supervisory model in the near-future. 
The global fi nancial – later economic – crisis originated from the United States 
and turned the world’s attention to the importance of fi nancial supervisory audits. 
On 11th November 2008 the European Commission charged the committee headed 
by Jacques de Larosiere with the task to examine (1) how to organise the best way 
for the supervision of the European fi nancial institutes and fi nancial markets in 
order to ensure the (a) prudential position of the fi nancial institutions, (b) adequate 
operation of the fi nancial markets and (c) the position of the depositors, the insured 
and the investors? (2) How to strengthen the cooperation between the European 
supervisory bodies connection with (a) the fi nancial stability, (b) the forecast sy-
stems and (c) crisis management? (3) How could the European supervisory bodies 
and authorities cooperate with other important states at international level in order 
to keep up the fi nancial stability? [De Larosier Report, 2009]
The „De Larosier” Report issued on 25th February 2009 touches upon the 
causes of the crisis and makes 31 recommendations starting from the national 
regulatory steps fi nishing with the international steps (for example: renewal of the 
capital requirements of BASEL II; accepting SOLVENCY II as soon as possible).
The report recommends setting up a new group called European Systemic 
Risk Council (ESRC). Its task will be to form judgements and make recommen-
dations on macro-prudential policy, issue risk warnings, compare observations 
on macro-economic and prudential developments and give direction on these is-
sues. Besides, it has to participate in international cooperation (IMF, FSF, G20). 
Another group is the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) which 
is also recommended to be established. It contains in fact the 3 level committees 
which operate as an authority in the future with a wide range of rights and tasks. 
It is important that because of many reasons the report does not recommend 
a cross-border supervisory institution at pan-EU level!
At international level the report recommends that the Financial Stability 
Forum (FSF) should be responsible for coordinating the work of the various 
international standard setters in achieving international regulatory consistency 
through international colleges.
The question „what” can after all arise connected with the „new” groups 
(ESRC, ESFS and FSF): Is it worth establishing another costly institution? Of 
course we have to see the other side of the coin too. If we can answer the ques-
tion of what kind of other expenses could be avoided with the help of these new 
institutes, then we have already got the answer [Farkas, 2007].
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3.3. Financial aspects of sustainable revitalization
Parallel with the process of globalization the structures of the economies have 
been changing. New industries are born and the old ones use to be outsourced to 
another – developing – country or simply fi nishing the operation. As a result of 
it all cities have diffi culties with its inheritance namely left warehouses, unused 
offi ce buildings and because of the worsening economic conditions the number 
of the residents starts to decline. 
In order to achieve that these parts of the cities become revitalized the local 
government should make plans and has to stimulate the investors and the eco-
nomy with its means that are usually manifesting in different allowances and 
subsidies. The main aim of these means is to urge investors to make a fl agship 
property development that could play infl uential and catalytic role in urban re-
generation. If this investment attracts other investments the goal will be reached 
[Bianchini, Dawson, Evans, 1992]. 
This kind of investments requires a lot of resources. The sources of these mo-
neys are typically the follows: (1) Private investors, (2) Public investors, and (3) 
Development funds. The fi rst one is use to be profi t oriented private companies 
while the others are connected to the public sector. From this point of view the 
fi rst is connected directly to the fi nancial markets while the others to the fi scal 
policy of the (local)government. The fi rst risk factor then comes from the incorre-
ct operation of the fi nancial market namely if there is not enough good condition 
credit on the market the private investors may delay or cancel their intention to 
invest even they could get a lot of allowances. The second – and higher – risk fac-
tor is the balance of the budget of the (local)government. In those countries where 
the budget used to have a negative balance both in national and local level there 
is no such opportunities to make these kinds of investments nevertheless these 
investments could be the source of further growth. Inside the European Union the 
(local)governmental part of the investments could be partly of fully substituted 
by EU funds particularly in the new member states. 
The sustainability is the third risk factor. It is not enough to make an invest-
ment it should be sustained. In this there is a big stress on maintaining the cir-
cumstances and of course not only maintain but improve as the needs of the local 
residents changing. For instance in the case of culture-led urban regeneration 
[J-K Seo, 2002] it is very important to be able to support the local cultural insti-
tutions to keep the character of the revitalized area. It requires resources form the 
(local) government’s budget. 
4. Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to throw light on the limits of the effectiveness of both 
fi scal and monetary (supervisory) audits and the effects made on revitalization 
programs.
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The effi ciency of fi scal audits – similar to the ECA practice – can be made 
by a kind of reliability declaration at national level, too. It helps to fi nd the real 
causes of the faults and mistakes with the ability of structural analysis. We ex-
amined the fi scal audit by its parts: fi nancial regularity audit and performance 
audit. It was shown that the problems appear not at the regularity part but at the 
performance part. The cause of it is that there is not specifi ed and clear (1) what 
the roles and tasks of the state are, (2) desired developing course and (3) the pri-
orities which is coupled with an inadequate budget planning method. This way 
the „value for money” principle cannot be successful. It is important to notice that 
in the public sector there is not enough capacity in the control system to supervise 
everything; that is why the external and internal audits have some important roles 
which are based on uniform standards. It is extremely true for the local level of 
the public sector. Besides, connected with EU supports, the connection of inter-
nal and external audits (connection points) is also very important. 
The weak-points of the monetary (supervisory) audits come basically from 
the fl exibility and responsiveness of the supervisory system. The accelerated fi -
nancial product innovation and the big fi nancial conglomerates require a similar 
size, quickly reacting uniformed and/or integrated supervisory body or a net of 
supervisory bodies. The different supervisory models make this uniform-process 
clumsy, but the recommendations of the international organizations and institu-
tes show a tendency to become standardized. 
The common point at the fi eld of fi scal and monetary (supervisory) audits is 
that both of them have to cooperate with the local/company internal auditors in 
order to achieve the aims. It is also common that the lack of adequate operation 
lead to serious problems. The problems at fi scal audits make their effects felt slo-
wly but surely and it locates mostly at local level; monetary (supervisory) audits 
make their effects felt fast and locates not only in local level. Partly due to the 
pervious facts both type of audits exceeds the mere determination of the facts and 
forecasting and prevention also belong to their priorities. 
The sustainability of revitalization requires a lot of resources and the advan-
tages from the viewpoint of the society appear only on long-term. The private 
investors could realize their profi t relatively soon so the stress is again on the 
measuring the results (performance of the public money – „value for money”). It 
is worth to spend public moneys on maintaining and developing these revitalized 
areas until the advantages (sociological, economic, etc.) of sustaining these areas 
are higher. 
Summarizing the previously mentioned facts we can say that the stress is no 
longer on the fi nancial regularity audits but rather on the performance audits. The 
main goal is to achieve the “value for money” principle which will fi nally lead to 
the correct, economic and effective use of public money both at national and at 
EU level. Looking at the monetary (supervisory) audits we can say that the future 
is defi nitely in the hand of the international organizations and institutes which 
can lead to a uniform and integrated supervisory body. Finally without adequate 
fi nancial background no any revitalization project can be successful at long term. 
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